The dominant managed care model in the USA is the individual practice association (IPA), in which physicians in separate practices contract with a health plan. One alternative model, the capitated multispecialty group practice (CMGP), has some distinct advantages: (i) the best randomized trial comparing a health management organization (HMO) with indemnity insurance showed equivalent health outcomes for a prepaid group-practice model HMO, with about a 40% saving in cost, mostly from lower hospital utilization. There is no comparable evidence for IPA-style HMO's; (ii) most managed care plans control costs through 'gatekeeper' primary care physicians or capitated payment. Strong financial disincentives to care, applied to small practices, lead to a significant risk of withholding needed care. Large capitated groups diffuse the risk among hundreds or thousands of physicians; (iii) small practices also lack the financial resources and expertise to develop information systems, continuous quality improvement programs, and other means of improving efficiency. Larger groups can integrate specialty and primary care, laboratory, pharmacy, information technology and other services, to improve quality and cost-effectiveness, while maintaining physician control of the process; (iv) in urban California, HMO enrollment in six large capitated groups increased by 91% from 1990 to 1994. Hospital utilization for these groups was less than half the USA average; (v) because it is self-insured, the CMGP could contract directly with purchasers, eliminating the need for the insurance intermediary.
care proposal failed. One reason for that failure was the be based on good scientific evidence that the new health demonstration of the ability of health care purchasers (in care system is more cost-effective and of at least equivalent the USA these are mainly employers) to band together in quality to the system it replaces. That is only partly true. purchasing coalitions to control the cost of health care, which
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment (RHIE), begun had been increasing at twice the rate of inflation. In 1991 in the mid 1970s, remains the largest randomized controlled private employer health insurance premiums increased by trial of the effects of health insurance type on costs and 11.5%; in 1994 the increase dropped to only 4.8% [10] . health outcomes, and the one with the longest follow-up. Indeed, uncontrollable health care costs had been perceived The study compared fee-for-service insurance with different as a major threat to the economic health of the nation. Since levels of copayment (free, n=304; pay, n=571), and a prepaid 1994, the continued control of health care cost has contributed group practice, the Group Health Cooperative of Puget substantially to the current strength of the USA economy [6, Sound (n=798) . Compared with fee-for-service insurance, 11].
the prepaid group practice subjects experienced about 40% If the USA's experience with managed care is to be of less hospital utilization, but with somewhat more outpatient value to other health care systems, it is essential that the visits, and greater use of preventive services. Both disdifferences among managed-care systems operating in the cretionary (elective) and non-discretionary (non-elective) hos-USA be understood. The catch-all phrases 'health main-pitalization was reduced, reflecting an organizational practice tenance organization' and managed care are used to refer to style emphasizing more outpatient treatment [13] . For the organizations that are quite different one from another. The groups as a whole, health outcomes were similar. However, specific details of financial and administrative arrangements for lower-income subjects who were initially ill, outcomes in the various types have profound consequences on the were worse in the prepaid group practice [14] . A plausible context, the processes, and often the outcomes of medical explanation by the authors was that low-income members may decisions. A detailed discussion of the variety of managed-have more difficulty negotiating the organizational barriers to care arrangements is beyond the scope of this paper, and utilization which seem to be common in prepaid group may be found elsewhere. Landon et al. have described recently practices [14] . the growing complexity and variety of health care or-A randomized trial of prepaid, capitated (n=384) care ganizations and the increasing conceptual difficulty of ana-compared with fee-for-service insurance (n=387) for elderly lyzing the components of the organizations that may be Medicaid (USA and state-funded insurance for low-income relevant to issues of cost, quality, and physician behavior people) recipients was carried out in Minnesota. Subjects [12] .
randomized to the prepaid Medicaid group were able to This paper will concentrate on the following issues that self-select among seven different plans, representing a very the author perceives as being important in determining the heterogeneous group including a closed-panel health manfuture of managed care, both in the USA and elsewhere: agement organization (HMO), a network HMO, and five • what evidence demonstrates that the quality of managed independent practice associations. After 1 year, no significant care is equivalent to fee-for-service medicine? Does the differences were seen in health outcomes for the two groups. evidence show a benefit for all forms of managed care, Subjects in the prepaid group had significantly fewer physician or only some forms? visits [adjusted odds ratio=0.46, 95% confidence interval • what led to the rapid increase in managed care in the (CI)=0.29-0.74] and hospital admissions (adjusted odds USA in the mid-1990s? ratio=0.55, 95% CI=0.32-0.94) [15] . From the standpoint • California has become the hotbed of the managed care of analyzing differences among prepaid health plans, the revolution in the USA. What lessons can be learned study is limited in the sample size, heterogeneity of plans from California's experience with managed care? and lack of randomization to plan (as noted, subjects selected • what is the impact of different financial incentives and themselves into one of seven plans). Lurie et al. performed practice organizations on physician autonomy and ethical another randomized trial of Medicaid patients diagnosed with medical practice? chronic mental illness, with a 1-year follow-up period. This • does the capitated multispecialty medical group model study also did not show any significant adverse effect of still need a health insurance intermediary? enrollment in the prepaid plan [16].
• will the development of new methods of measuring and
The best designed observational study comparing fee-formonitoring quality permit the accurate comparison of service with HMO cost, utilization and outcomes was the different health plans or providers?
Medical Outcomes Study (MOS); the MOS confirmed the • what are the potential drawbacks of the capitated multi-RHIE finding of significantly lower hospital admission rates specialty group practice? Can they be overcome? for HMO plans (26-37% fewer admissions than for indemnity plans) [17] . Thus the two largest and best designed studies comparing costs and outcomes between fee-for-service (with Evidence comparing fee-for-service indemnity insurance) practice and HMOs demonstrate substantial cost savings due to decreased hospital utilization. The indemnity insurance with managed care
MOS appeared to confirm the poorer outcomes observed in the RHIE of poor, chronically ill patients treated in the HMO In the age of evidence-based medicine, one might expect that a national revolution in health care in the USA would versus the fee-for-service setting [ In the early 1990s, health care costs in the USA were over individual practice association (IPA)-model HMOs, but increasing at twice the rate of inflation. Indemnity insurance, methodological problems with the definition of type of plan previously the most popular form of health insurance, had and the small number of observations limited the strength been priced out of the market by sharp rises in fee-for-service of this conclusion [19] .
reimbursements. Much of the increase in health care costs In summary:
was due to the rapid growth of expensive, high-technology medical care provided to an aging and demanding population • the best study comparing fee-for-service indemnity inthat believed that more medical care was, in fact, better surance with a managed care system used a prepaid medical care. Physicians and patients were insulated from the group practice model, similar to the Kaiser Permanente costs of their decisions by employer-or government-paid Medical Care Program, as a comparison. Similar health insurance that paid the physician the 'usual and customary' outcomes were seen for the prepaid group practice fee -whatever the physician's conscience would permit. The subjects as a whole at about 40% less cost. However, physician's financial interests and the patient's expectations low-income, ill members had worse outcomes than in were perfectly aligned to increase the use of the newest and fee-for-service practice. This may be attributable to nonmost expensive care. financial barriers to access;
The employers, who usually paid either all of or the great • there are no good studies that compare health outcomes majority of the cost of health insurance for their employees, and costs between IPA-type HMOs and either fee-forhad no way of comparing the quality of one health plan with service or prepaid group practice. Thus the HMO model that of another. In any case, there was an unlimited tax with by far the largest enrollment in the USA has deduction for employee health insurance, so the employer never been subjected to a well-designed experimental was in effect only paying about half the cost of the insurance. or observational trial of its effect on cost or outcomes.
As health care became more expensive, it became more There is no good reason to believe that one can excatastrophic to get sick without insurance; yet the cost of trapolate from the RHIE to a much different model of insurance was so high for individuals (who got no tax break managed care.
for private health insurance) that 37 million Americans had no health insurance. In this setting of exploding costs and lack of universal Why did the managed care revolution coverage, the Clinton administration introduced a health care reform proposal in 1993-1994. Initially regarded as likely to occur in the mid-1990s?
be enacted, political momentum for the proposal declined with claims that the cost would be greater than that originally For historical reasons related largely to preferential tax treatment and union bargaining, employers are the purchasers of estimated, and with concerns -stimulated partly by the insurance industry -about the impact of a 'federal takeover' health care insurance for most Americans. With the exception of a few prepaid group practice health plans, until the 1970s of health care. In August 1994, a large coalition of employers in California [the Pacific Business Group on Health (PBGH)] most insurance was indemnity insurance-paid fee-for-service physician and hospital care. The federal HMO Act of 1973 announced that new health insurance premiums for the following year with no cost increase had been negotiated. provided grant and loan support to encourage the formation of HMOs, and also required employers to offer HMO plans The primary political impetus for the bill, control of health care cost escalation, was lost. On the day that this rate as an alternative to traditional indemnity insurance coverage, if a federally qualified HMO was available in that geographical agreement was announced, the stocks of for-profit HMOs on the New York Stock Exchange plummeted. When major the parts of the USA where managed care has a high restructuring of the health care system began occurring penetration, and where there is a surplus of physicians without government intervention in the midst of the debate relative to the needs of a managed care system. The HMO over national health care reform, much of the support for contracts with primary care and specialty physicians can major federal reform collapsed [21] . The market was finally be terminated easily without showing cause. Particularly starting to operate in health care.
for specialists who are more in surplus than are primary physicians, a substantial part of their practice can disappear virtually overnight if they lose an HMO contract. This gives the solo practice or small practice physician very little negotiating power with HMOs; repeated reductions 1994: the revolution in managed care in in payments are the usual result. Perhaps more important,
California
the isolated physician is in a very poor position to serve as a strong advocate for the patients' interests against a Continuing for several years after 1994, the PBGH and other denial of service by an HMO, when the physician's large purchasers in California such as the California Public livelihood is dependent on the continuing goodwill of that Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) successfully ne-HMO. gotiated either reductions in health care premiums for their
In an age of increasing complexity of medical practice, members covered in managed care plans, or very small of strong pressures to reduce costs of health care delivery, increases in premiums, which were less than the rate of and of the need to demonstrate quality of care, the small inflation [11] .
practice physician does not have the resources to invest Subsequently, health care costs in the USA as a whole also in information systems or alternative forms of practice. slowed dramatically. In 1996, the rate of increase, 4.4%, was
Nor is the physician likely to have the expertise needed the lowest in four decades [22] . For 1998, there may be a to evaluate, acquire, and implement new practice modes larger increase in health care costs nationally, but large purdeveloped by others. chasers such as PBGH and CalPERS have succeeded in By contrast, larger medical groups of several hundred negotiating increases of only 1% [6] . PBGH also negotiated to several thousand physicians, which exist in urban areas 'pay for performance' financial mechanisms to encourage of California, do have the resources necessary to institute health plans to adhere to quality of care guidelines developed new modes of practice, to develop information systems, by its Health Services Advisory Committee [20] .
and to implement systems for monitoring and improving The next step in the drive for accountability of health quality of care. The larger groups are multispecialty groups, plans to purchasers will be to adjust premiums for the risk so that specialty expertise is more easily available, and of the insured populations. In the absence of risk adjustment, potentially can be as efficient or even more efficient than plans have a strong motivation to 'cherry pick' -to encourage primary physicians in providing care to patients with lower utilizers to join the plan, and higher utilizers to avoid conditions that fall in their specialty. Particularly if the it. As will be discussed below, this motivation becomes even group physicians are salaried rather than paid on a feestronger when health plans are being monitored for health for-service basis, it may be advantageous to decrease rather care outcomes: if low cardiovascular surgery mortality is an than raise barriers to access to specialists. A phone call, indicator of quality of care, hospitals and health plans may a walk down the hall, or a 'curbside consultation' can be avoid operating on sicker patients to make their reports look an effective and very efficient way of bringing the specialists better. For the market to work properly, health plans should expertise to the service of the patient, and to the educational be given a financial incentive to recruit and retain higher risk benefit of the primary physician. individuals. Although the methodology of risk adjustment is
In addition to the organizational advantages of a larger not yet completely developed, this will be an important part group, the growth of capitation as a payment mechanism of making managed competition work [23] .
from the HMO to the physician adds substantial advantage to membership in a large group practice. Capitation payment means that a physician, or group of physicians, is paid a stipulated amount ('per member per month') to provide a
The impact of practice type and defined set of services for the HMO's members: this may physician payment mechanism on be for primary care, for primary and specialty care together, or in some cases for all care including hospital care and physician autonomy and ethical practice out-of-area services (i.e. emergency care provided to insured individuals who were temporarily away from their usual Historically, most physicians in the USA have practiced in site of care. 'Stop-loss' insurance -reinsurance purchased small practices, either solo practices or small groups of by a physician or group that indemnifies the practice for physicians in the same specialty. As indemnity insurance expenses above a certain high level -can protect a small became unaffordable due to rapid escalation in health care practice against the risk of very high utilization (a heart costs, and as managed care has become more popular due transplant, say). However, the individual physician in a its better ability to control costs, the small private practice is rapidly becoming an endangered species -at least in small practice still has a very strong financial incentive to reduce utilization of specialty services, including surgery. specialist is usually expensive for the HMO. The primary physician is therefore put in the position of controlling To the extent that needed care may be withheld -and it is often difficult to judge what is needed and what is not access to specialists: the patient cannot initiate an appointment with a specialist, but must be referred by the -this strong financial incentive puts the physician in a position of conflict of interest with the needs of the primary physician. Some portion of the primary physician's salary is withheld against the risk of utilization of specialty patient.
In a large group practice, the capitation payment is services and surgical procedures. In capitated systems, the risk for the physician in a small practice may be even spread among hundreds or thousands of physicians. The impact of a single medical decision for a given patient, greater: payment for referrals may come directly out of therefore, is minimal. The physician is thus in a much the primary physicians capitation payment. These strong more neutral situation: neither paid more for doing too financial incentives to avoid referral are rightly felt to much, nor paid more for doing too little. In many large constitute a conflict of interest [26] . The overall result of groups physicians are salaried, although with some pay this system is greater reliance on primary physician care differential for 'productivity', such as caring for a large rather than specialty care; and with a strong motivation panel of patients. This strategy among many large group not to refer patients to specialists. These systems are now practices of engaging staff physicians on salary has been in widespread use, yet they are not based on any good regarded as the least likely to lead to ethical compromise evidence of the health outcomes associated with such a of the physician-patient relationship [24] .
practice model. As noted previously, the only large-scale What has been the impact of the growth of managed randomized trial of HMO versus fee-for-service care, the care in California on physician practice? Robinson and RHIE, enrolled HMO patients in a group-practice-model Casalino have described the growth of six large medical HMO with salaried physicians. groups in California between 1990 and 1994 [25] . HMO enrollment with capitated payment increased in these six groups by 91% from 1990 to 1994. Because these medical groups assume the risk for utilization of hospital care, Does the medical group need the health they have a strong motivation to decrease hospital utilization,
plan?
and this did indeed occur. Mean hospital days for nonMedicare (i.e. under 65 years of age) enrollees ranged from
We have now described a medical practice model consisting 120 to 149 hospital days per 1000 enrollees in 1994, of a large, multispecialty medical group, paid under capitation. compared with 232 for California as a whole and 297 for
The capitation payment may include payment for hospital the USA in 1993. For Medicare enrollees (over the age services, out-of-area services, and referral to physicians outof 65 years), comparable figures were 643-936 days per side the group. In other words, the medical group is at risk 1000 enrollees for the six groups, compared with 1337 for all medical expenses that might be incurred by a member for California and 1698 for the USA [25] .
of a health plan. The group will probably contract with one As Robinson and Casalino point out, large medical or more hospitals to provide care for its patients at a favorable groups paid through capitation offer a potentially worthwhile rate. The medical group will put into place its own utilization alternative to the two extremes of physician employees in management mechanisms. In order to establish its costs and hospital-owned HMOs and subcontractor status in IPAnegotiate its payment with the health plan, it will need its type HMOs. The physicians in the medical group take on own accounting and actuarial expertise. Why, then does this for themselves all decisions regarding care provided, and medical group need an insurance company as an intermediary? assume the responsibility for controlling utilization. Rather
Aside from regulatory requirements that are left over from than having to go to a non-physician HMO employee for the days of indemnity insurance, the only apparent reasons prior authorization for hospital admission -typical with to need an insurance plan intermediary are for marketing IPA-model HMOs -the prepaid group practice sets up purposes and for capital formation. Large employers like to its own rules for admission. Typically, because the physicians be able to deal with a single health plan for its employees have no financial incentive to admit patients to the hospital, around the country, rather than contract with individual no prior authorization is required. medical groups. However, there is no intrinsic reason (antitrust This system therefore permits the physician to retain issues aside) not to form coalitions of medical groups, or even the autonomy to practice as he or she sees fit, albeit for medical groups to combine into a national organization for within the constraints of a collaborative culture that the purposes of marketing their health care services. Indeed encourages general cost-consciousness. The impact of a several large companies have been formed that perform this given medical decision on the physician's income is so function as well as other administrative functions for large diffuse that it is minimal, as long as the individual physician numbers of physicians. These are physician management is paid by salary.
In sharp contrast, IPA-style HMOs often use a 'gate-organizations (PMOs). Raising capital is another important issue for health care keeper' system to constrain utilization of specialty services. Since specialists in fee-for-service practices often use organizations. For-profit health plans can raise money by selling shares; non-profit hospitals can sell bonds. Medical expensive, high-technology services liberally, referral to a groups have more difficulty raising capital. On the other Unfortunately, much of what physicians do that makes them hand, some of the large groups studied by Robinson and good physicians, particularly in the acute care setting, is Casalino have sold their assets to outside investors, then lease difficult to quantify. While there is much enthusiastic support them back. This reduces the capital needs of the group [25] . for developing and adopting such quality indicators, there is also a danger in focusing on what we can measure, as if only that were important. Once indicators are adopted and purchasers begin choosing health plans, hospitals, and physCan managed care lead to higher quality icians on the basis of good indicator scores, those scores will health care?
invariably improve: what gets measured gets done, or at least gets reported. Reliance on performance indicators is One important aspect of the ongoing health care revolution particularly worrisome when physicians face strong disin the USA is the demand by purchasers, especially large incentives to utilization of care. Good performance scores employers, to 'pay for performance': they want to be able to should be regarded as a necessary but not sufficient measure compare the quality of health plans and providers along of quality of care. several dimensions, so that they can make better choices Necessary to the success of performance measures is the about the use of their funds for employees' health insurance. development of sophisticated medical information systems This demand began with a few large national employers such that are designed to collect essential clinical information in as the Xerox Corporation, and was then picked up by the a standardized way. Development, or at least purchase, of purchasing coalitions, and most importantly by the National such systems is likely to be very expensive, and therefore to Commission for Quality Assurance (NCQA) [27] . NCQA require a large organization to have adequate capital to fund is the industry-funded organization that accredits HMOs. it. In addition to the advantage of size, larger organizations Encouraged by the large employers and by at least one large are more likely to incorporate subsystems of care, such as HMO, Kaiser Permanente, NCQA began developing a set pharmacy and laboratory services, within the organization. Measuring quality is important. More important, however, Other organizations, such as the Joint Commission for is using that information to improve current practices, making Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the Foundathem more scientific, more cost-effective, and more patienttion for Accountability, have developed or are developing sets friendly. Although not as capital-intensive as medical inof indicators to measure quality. Most recently, a Presidential formation systems, the process of continuous quality imcommission recommended that a set of quality indicators provement (CQI) also benefits from an integrated service be developed on a federal level to encourage health care delivery system. For example, if we want to improve the organizations to compete on the basis of quality. These management of high cholesterol, it is very helpful to have an efforts, particularly NCQA's HEDIS, have received substantial integrated pharmacy, nurses and dietitians, specialty physicians publicity in the national mass media, with articles rating the with expertise in lipid management, an efficient and accurate quality of HMOs, primarily according to the HEDIS 'report chemistry laboratory, and a sophisticated computer system card'.
to track patient lipid measurements and feed them back to Although these efforts to measure and compare quality of staff and patients. Such 'best practice' development probably care show substantial promise, one must be cautious about occurs best in an organization of at least moderate size. overenthusiastic adoption and interpretation of these measWhether there is further economy of scale beyond a certain ures. However, a detailed description of these indicator sets size is not yet clear. It does appear, however, that a system is beyond the scope of this article. It may suffice to note that is fairly integrated in its services, and with adequate that the first indicator sets emphasize adherence to evidenceresources and expertise to commit to such a task, is more based preventive services guidelines and other measures for likely to be successful in such efforts than is a small office which there is good scientific evidence of benefit. That is, practice. of course, necessary otherwise we might be encouragingIf such efforts in CQI and re-engineering of medical even demanding -that all health plan members receive practice do indeed show us the future of medical care, then preventive screening or other care that will not really improve that future is very likely to be in a fairly large multispecialty health. On the other hand, it is clear that these indicators medical group. That group will have the financial incentive, have been adopted because: (i) everyone agrees on their through capitated payment, to look for the most efficient importance; (ii) it is clear whether the procedure has been ways to provide high quality medicine, and to demonstrate performed or not; and (iii) the denominator of the population that quality and value to purchasers. There will be adequate in need is readily identified (e.g. all women aged 50-74 years integration of the medical group, hospital, pharmacy, and need mammograms). Other indicators being developed will ancillary services to permit the close collaboration necessary examine mortality after myocardial infarction, and other measures that attempt to assess the quality of acute care. for CQI to work. Whether the organization needs to be 'vertically integrated' (combining both insurance and ad-practice. Secondly, by recruiting the best, most qualified and most caring physicians into the group. Solo practices' losses ministrative functions, primary and specialty care, and ancillary are now group practices' gains, as entry into a large group is services into a single organization) or 'virtually integrated' now seen as an advantage, rather than as a position lower in (linking those functions together by contractual arrangements prestige, as it often was in the past. with separate entities) remains to be seen. Also unclear is:
The best guarantee against a large prepaid group practice what is the indispensable function of the 'health plan'? If becoming too rigid and bureaucratic is the active competition health plans continue to be mostly for-profit organizations of the marketplace. The bureaucratic barriers to access in that give their first loyalty to outside shareholders, that pay group practice HMOs (long waiting times to appointments, their executives many times what the best-paid physician etc.) are being overcome to a large degree, in order to avoid makes, and that do not contribute a necessary function to loss of membership. Such changes would not be occurring the system, they may be replaced. In their place might be in the absence of a serious threat to the survival of these either a non-profit organization that handles marketing and organizations, from competitors that had succeeded in overcoordination among geographic areas; or direct contracting coming the group practice HMO's previous advantage in between a coalition of medical groups and the purchasers of lower hospital utilization. care.
Fortunately, the model of capitated payment to the large medical group, together with the existence of a wide variety of expertise within the organization, provides the flexibility Some cautions about the prepaid group to adopt highly innovative modes of practice, where they can practice model be shown to provide advantages in cost or quality. If a lipid patient can be managed by a nurse, contacting the patient The integrated, multispecialty group practice model has, as by telephone rather than requiring an office visit (because we have seen, many advantages. However, we must also that's what the insurance reimburses), and if the patients are point out some potential disadvantages of this practice model, happy with this (as they are) then money has been saved compared with the traditional small practice, or an IPA-which can be put to better use. If hospitalization for asthma style HMO. Modern medical care tends to be complex and can be reduced through a patient education program that technical, requiring a complex organization and specialization encourages use of a peak flow meter, the entire organization profits from the reduced hospital costs. Capitation and inof labor both among physicians and among ancillary pertegration, therefore, provide the incentives and the orsonnel. For an ill patient, this complexity can become a ganizational structure to adopt whatever practice mode is nightmare. A patient in a large group practice HMO might most effective. The control of medical practice and medical call the doctor's telephone number, be put into an indecision-making is retained by physicians. These physicians comprehensible automated telephone answering system, or work as colleagues in an environment that encourages costreach a 'call center' hundreds of miles away, and speak with consciousness, but refrains from taking a physician to task a nurse who has never seen the patient's physician, much for any individual patient care decision. less the patient. The physician might not have the same sense It is sad that traditional solo and small practice is becoming of personal responsibility for the patient's care that one in less and less viable, for this means less choice for both private practice might have; perhaps the physician joined the physicians and patients. But in today's health care setting, in group precisely because it offers a 'lifestyle' with predictable which large for-profit health plans are more and more in hours.
control of health care, the only realistic way for physicians The well-coordinated efforts of the large group to develop to regain and retain the primacy of the physician in health evidence-based protocols for hospital care or treatment of care is by organizing themselves into large groups that have chronic diseases might succeed in reducing variation, and a better chance of survival in today's highly competitive might in some cases result in better health outcomes at lower health care market. cost. But if protocols are followed thoughtlessly, or adhered to out of fear of a lower performance measurement score, then errors will surely occur that will result in harm to patients.
Other problems occur because physicians are salaried.
Conclusion
Decisions on physician salary are made on an administrative basis, rather than on the basis of services provided. While The development of managed care in the USA has reflected this is good on the whole, there will always be perceptions partly the response to the health care system that was in of unfairness in setting pay, and jealousy between physicians place when HMOs first were formed. Although the largest who think some of their colleagues are not working as and one of the oldest group plans, Kaiser Permanente, was hard. Administrative duties, for example, may be either in the model for the Nixon administration's HMO Act of 1973, perception or reality a way of getting out of seeing patients. it was instead the IPA model that became much more popular.
How do we deal with these and other potential weaknesses This was due to the reluctance of the public to give up the of the large group practice? First of all, by recognizing that personal physicians they felt comfortable with in favor of a large, anonymous medical group, and to the reluctance of there is no perfect organization, and no perfect medical
